Instigating conflict in ethnic areas:  The pipelines will traverse 22 townships across the whole of central Burma.  This area includes several ethnic regions such as Arakan and Shan States, which largely see themselves as separate states and are at odds with the military junta.  Before the ruling SPDC begins natural resource projects, it often employs military offensives against ethnic groups to clear project areas.  For example, in August 2009, the Burmese military launched a campaign in Shan State against the ethnically-Chinese Kokaing militia just prior to the planned start of pipeline construction.  As a result, an estimated 30,000 refugees fled over the border to China. 

Inequitable government spending on social development:  Burma is one of the least developed countries in the world, with inadequate social welfare programs to meet the needs of its people.  Social development investigations consistently put Burma at the bottom of the rankings.  For example, the World Health Organization ranked Burma 190^th out of 191 countries for an overall health system and Burma has the highest HIV/AIDS rates in the region. Dismal social development rates are consistent with the SPDC's spending on health and education programs for the people, which is less than 1% of GDP.  Instead, the SPDC spends 40% of the state's budget on the military, which uses heavy-handed tactics to suppress dissent from the people.  (Stats from presentation by Shan Women's Action Network at the "Trade, Investment and Sustainability between China and the Mekong Region" conference co-sponsored by Heinrich Boll Foundation and National Development and Reform Commission in Beijing, 26-27 November, 2009)

Despite Burma's abundance of natural gas that is exported to neighboring countries, its citizens do not have access to reliable gas or electricity supplies.  The comparison to the situation in countries receiving Burma's gas is striking:  per capita, Burma consumes less than 5% of electricity consumed by Thailand or China.  In Arakan State, from which the Shwe gas flows, 90% of households use candles for light and firewood to cook.  Yet reports indicate that all of the Shwe gas will be shipped to China.  Residents have expressed deep dissatisfaction with this:  "Although we have a lot of gas we get only two hours of electricity in Sittwe.  In this situation how can we develop our industry? Without industry, how can we develop our state? Actually the gas money should go to different sectors like health, education, economy and social development. But in this project, there isn't any plan for that. That is why we are against this Shwe gas project." - U Aye Tha Aung, Secretary of the Committee Representing People's Parliament and Secretary of the Arakan League for Democracy, Corridor of Power, p.17

High risk of environmental destruction.  This project bisects the Indo-Burma biological hotspot and runs through several ecologically sensitive areas across Burma.  These sensitive areas include mango swamps, estuaries, small rivers, and a national marine park in Arakan State; as well as the Mizoram-Manipur-Kachin rainforests, Chin Hills-Arakan yoma montane forests, Irrawaddy dry forests, Irrawaddy moist deciduous forests, Northern Indochina subtropical forests, a wildlife sancturary, and a bird sanctuary as they move across central Burma to Yunnan.  These vulnerable forests are critical to storm protection and are home to endangered species.

Without proper preparation and environmental management, pollution from offshore natural gas projects can destroy marine life, further decimating the livelihoods of communities near the project.  Emissions from drilling rigs and natural gas flares can also cause air pollution.  As no Environmental Impact Assessment has been released for the Shwe project, it is unclear whether the project will employ environmental management systems and adequate pollution prevention technology.

Historically, when the Burmese army provides security for extractive industry and infrastructure projects in Burma, local people are subject to abuses by these forces such as forced labor, sexual assault, forced relocations, loss of livelihoods, land confiscation and inadequate compensation.  This has been well documented during construction of the Sittwe-Rangoon highway, the Kyauk Phyu-Rangoon road and the Yadana/Yetagun pipelines. 

As of September 2009, up to 13,200 soldiers in 44 army divisions were already positioned along the pipeline route, including ethnic areas where the Burmese army did not previously have a presence (Corridor of Power, p.20).  Although the project is still at a very early stage, fact-finding missions to the pipeline-affected area by the Shwe Gas Movement has documented human rights violations in Kyauk Phyu Township since the start of construction in October 2009. 

Land confiscations:  Land has been confiscated by the Burmese military for the project. Some of these farmers have been forced to sign documents handing over their land to the project and have been given no compensation. Thus far over 1000 acres of land have been confiscated in Kyaukhpyu Township alone. The following are the villages in Kyaukphyu Township where involuntary land confiscation occurred and the forced relocation took place: Gown Chewin, Thit Pate Taung, Saba Shar, Pone Nay Gyi, Lake Khamaw, Kalar Bar, Gaw Da

Forced relocations:  Moreover, people in Kyaukphyu Township who are living along the pipeline route have been told to move their houses before April 2010. They do not have any place to move to and haven't received any compensation.  As a result, farmers cannot cultivate their paddy fields and small plantations will be unable to sustain their livelihood and directly endangers the prospects of their children's education.

Loss of livelihood:  A majority of the local population are either farmers or fishermen. Due to offshore surveying and what appears to be early construction, fishing areas are also restricted by the Burmese navy, and as such fishermen cannot earn their daily livelihood. Boatmen are forced to act as porters by the navy.

The Shwe Gas Movement has received more disturbing information, including forced labor, which currently is being confirmed, but fits in with above patterns from this project and other development projects in Burma. 

Military rape of ethnic women has been well documented in Burma.  In 2001, the Shan Women's Action Network (SWAN) released the report, "License to Rape," which documents the widespread and systematic rape of ethnic women in Burma committed by military personnel.  That investigation, as well as subsequent monitoring from SWAN has shown that military rapes are committed with impunity, as victims seldom have access to justice or recourse.  Often, women and communities are threatened and punished if they complain about sexual assaults.

Corruption:
The sale of natural gas is the largest single income earner for the junta, accounting for nearly 50% of export revenues in 2008-09 for a total of US$ 2.4 billion.  The revenues from the oil and gas sector in Burma have no independent oversight and are recorded in Burma's public accounts in kyat at the official exchange rate of 6 kyat to US$ 1 while the market value of the kyat stands at approximately 1,200 kyat to US$ 1.  This massive discrepancy means that the majority of gas revenues are not recorded in Burma's official budget, leaving them available for discretionary spending and making it impossible to trace how the majority of Burma's hydrocarbon earnings are being spent. 

The sale of the Shwe gas and pipeline transit fees will provide the junta with an estimated US$ 1 billion annually for 30 years, further fueling this corrupt system.

Illegal Weapons:
The junta has a past track record of using revenues from the sale of natural gas to purchase weapons for military campaigns used against the country's own people.  Reports have shown that the regime has been on an accelerated arms-buying spree since 2001, roughly when it received the first gas revenues from the Yadana pipeline in eastern Burma.

The Daewoo consortium and CNPC further enable the military regime to purchase arms.  In Daewoo's case, this went as far as the company fabricating export documents in contravention of South Korean law in order to illegally export military machinery to Burma in 2002.  As a result, in November 2007 Daewoo International President Lee Tae-yong and Daewoo's former managing director were convicted along with 12 other high-ranking officials from South Korean companies of illegally exporting weapons technology and equipment to Burma. They were given lenient sentences but not before the facility, used to construct artillery shells and other illegal weaponry, was completed.